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INTRODUCTION 
To the extent that Marveon, Inc., (hereinafter 
"Marveon") has petitioned this Court to rehear the last two 
paragraphs of its Opinion filed February 10, 1989, Young 
Electric Sign Company (hereinafter "YESCO") agrees with and 
supports Marveon's petition. However, to the extent 
Marveon argues that YESCO should pay damages to Marveon as 
a result of the alleged breach of contract and that this Court 
should assess those damages in an amount equivalent to what 
Marveon's insurer paid on its behalf for its share of the 
judgment, YESCO vigorously objects. This Court should rehear 
argument by counsel for both Marveon and YESCO on the 
damage issue and it should determine that Marveon was not 
damaged by YESCO1s breach of contract (if any) for failure to 
provide insurance and is therefore not responsible to Marveon 
for any amount of money whatsoever. In the alternative, should 
this Court determine that such a ruling must come from the 
trial court, it should remand for a determination of damages 
actually suffered by Marveon as a result of YESCOfs failure 
to purchase an insurance policy with Marveon as a named 
insured. Damages should not be determined by some artificial 
standard of what coverage would the insurance policies have 
provided if actually purchased and how would payment have been 
allocated between the policies depending upon the relevant, 
comparable "other insurance" clauses. Rather, damages should 
be awarded on the basis of Marveon's actual damages incurred by 
reason of YESCO's failure to purchase insurance. 
YESCO asserts that no damages should be paid by it to 
Marveon for three distinct, yet related, reasons. First, 
Marveon's assets were purchased by YESCO prior to the 
accident which precipitated this lawsuit, and subsequent to the 
time Marveon purchased the insurance that ultimately covered 
Marveon for the negligence allocated to it by the jury. 
Marveon's liability resulted from its installation of a sign in 
1978. YESCO purchased the maintenance contract on that sign in 
August of 1981. At the time the accident occurred, YESCO owned 
virtually all of Marveon's equipment and employed most of its 
employees. For all intents and purposes, Marveon was YESCO, at 
least with respect to this sign, at the time of the accident. 
It is YESCO's position that Marveon's carrier is trying to 
subrogate against its own insured, a position that is clearly 
precluded by Utah law. 
Second, Marveon suffered no damage as a result of 
YESCO's failure to provide insurance for Marveon. Marveon 
purchased insurance three years prior to its asset sale to 
YESCO. After judgment, Marveon's carrier paid for 
Marveon's share of the judgment which was essentially 
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determined by multiplying its percentage of fault by the total 
damages. Marveon paid not one dime. Marveon!s carrier paid 
only for Marveon1s assigned negligence. A basic rule of 
subrogation is that the subrogated party, in this case 
Marveon1s insurance carrier, can only enforce those rights of 
action that Marveon has against YESCO. Because Marveon paid 
for none of YESCOfs fault, Marveon has no recoverable claim 
against YESCO founded on tort liability^ 
Finally, although Marveon may have a claim for breach 
of contract against YESCO, it has no damages. In any event, 
Marveon1s carrier has no subrogated interest in a breach of 
contract claim by Marveon against YESCO. This is particularly 
true in light of the fact that the policy of insurance which 
paid Marveon's share of liability was purchased three years 
prior to the asset sale of Marveon to YESCO. Further, it is 
Utah law that a subrogated interest must be the result of tort 
liability unless otherwise specified. 
ARGUMENT 
Essentially, Marveon has argued in its Petition for 
Rehearing that the measure of damages as a result of YESCO!s 
failure to purchase insurance on behalf of Marveon should be 
the amount of money paid out on behalf of Marveon through its 
insurance policy which was purchased prior to the sale of 
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Marveon1s contracts and assets to YESCO. As set out below/ 
this would be a completely improper result under the 
circumstances of this case. Nonetheless, it is absolutely 
essential that this Court determine what the measure of damages 
will be and apply that measure of damages to the facts at hand 
or remand to the trial court for guidance. YESCO agrees with 
Marveon that the measure of damages as set out by the Court in 
its Opinion handed down February 10f 1989, is inappropriate in 
the circumstances; however, YESCO does not agree with Marveon 
what the measure of damages, if any, should be. It is critical 
that the Court be allowed to step back from the case in order 
to see the entire picture. Counsel for Marveon urges a myopic 
analysis which will result in unfair treatment of parties in 
this case as well as to parties to cases in the future. This 
analysis will provide windfall recoveries for insurance 
companies not in any way related to the contractual 
arrangements between the parties to the action. 
POINT I 
AN INSURER MAY NOT RECOVER OR SUBROGATE AGAINST 
ITS OWN INSURED OR COINSURED UNDER A POLICY 
OF INSURANCE 
A brief restatement of the facts with respect to the 
history of Marveon and YESCO!s relationship is in order. 
In 1978, Marveon, through its employees, installed a sign at a 
Smith's Food King in South Salt Lake County. At that time, 
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Marveon had in place a policy of liability insurance. 
Subsequent to that time, in August of 1981, YESCO purchased 
virtually all of the assets and maintenance contracts of 
Marveon. As part of that sale, YESCO took over manufacturing 
operations of Marveon as well as most of its maintenance 
contracts and most of its assets. Further, YESCO hired many of 
Marveon1s employees to continue the same sort of work they were 
doing for Marveon, but from that point forward in the name of 
YESCO. Subsequent to the purchase of Marveon by YESCO, the 
sign which was initially installed by Marveon in 1978, and 
which was subsequently maintained by YESCO and others, fell and 
killed plaintiff's deceased, John Pickhover. As a result of 
the death of Mr. Pickhover, a wrongful death action ensued in 
which both Marveon and YESCO, among others, were named as party 
defendants. At the time that YESCO purchased the assets of 
Marveon, a Purchase Agreement between Marveon and YESCO was 
entered into. As a part of the agreement, YESCO promised to 
provide liability insurance for Marveon in an amount of 
$1,000,000. This was never done. 
Marveon filed a Motion for Summary Judgment for 
indemnification pursuant to the purchase agreement and the 
trial court granted that Motion. Ultimately, this Court 
sustained the trial court's granting of summary judgment but 
remanded for a determination of damages. Following the filing 
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of the Opinion of this Court, Marveon filed a Petition for 
Rehearing, essentially claiming that the determination of this 
Court with respect to damages was incorrect and perhaps outside 
the bounds of its authority. 
It is YESCO's position, because of its unique 
relationship to Marveon, that neither Marveon, nor its insurer 
in some subrogated capacity, may maintain an action against 
YESCO. At the time of trial, the jury determined the 
percentages of fault of both Marveon and YESCO. Marveon, 
through its carrier, paid its percentage of fault, and YESCO, 
through its carrier, paid its percentage of fault. Now, 
Marveon seeks to have this Court order that YESCO pay for 
Marveonfs share of the damages. This is wholly inappropriate 
under the circumstances. Marveon and YESCO are essentially one 
and the same. At the time the accident happened, the 
maintenance contract, which was originally sold by Marveon to 
Smith's, was owned by YESCO. Further, YESCO was, in fact, 
providing electrical maintenance on the sign. Also, YESCO's 
employees that maintained the sign included former employees of 
Marveon, employees that had originally installed the sign. 
Marveon and YESCO are indistinguishable for purposes of 
subrogation. 
The doctrine of subrogation allows an insurer, having 
paid a loss resulting from a peril insured against, to step 
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into the shoes of its insured and recoup its losses from a 
tort-feasor whose negligence caused the loss. Board of 
Education of Jordan School Dist. v. Hales, 566 P.2d 1246, 
1247 (Utah 1977). However, an insurer may not recover against 
its own insured or coinsured under a policy. Id. Without 
going into needless detail, it is YESCO's opinion that the 
insurance that was in place and purchased on behalf of Marveon 
prior to the sale of Marveon to YESCO inured to the benefit of 
YESCO once Marveon's assets, in particular the maintenance 
agreement which is the subject matter of this lawsuit, were 
purchased. In other words, when YESCO purchased Marveon, it 
purchased all of its assets including insurance coverages 
that would afford coverage for Marveon should Marveon be named 
in a suit subsequent to the sale. The insurance that was in 
place for Marveon directly benefited YESCO. As a consequence, 
YESCO is essentially an insured under Marveon's policy. 
Therefore, Marveon's carrier cannot maintain an action against 
YESCO for a subrogated interest. 
Counsel for Marveon has argued vigorously that there 
is no evidence with respect to insurance in the record and that 
it was brought up in the first instance by counsel for YESCO at 
oral argument on YESCOfs appeal from the summary judgment. 
However, the Court cannot make a decision with respect to 
damages in a vacuum. The Court has one of two options. It can 
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remand to the trial court to determine what damages were 
actually suffered by Marveon, or it can make its decision as a 
matter of law under the circumstances. The decisions of this 
Court must reflect reality. Counsel for Marveon urges a 
position that will ignore reality and allow a windfall to be 
reaped by Marveon's insurance carrier. A windfall not 
predicated on the risk adduced at the time the policy of 
insurance was purchased by Marveon nor contemplated in the 
premiums charged. 
POINT II 
MARVEON SUFFERED NO DAMAGE AS A RESULT 
OF YESCO'S FAILURE TO BUY INSURANCE 
This Court, in its decision handed down February 10, 
1989, remanded to the trial court to determine the 
compensable damages suffered by Marveon as a result of 
YESCO's breach. Apparently, this Court cited for the benefit 
of the trial court, the case of PPG Indus., Inc. v. 
Continental Heller Corp., 603 P.2d 108 (Ariz. App. 1979). The 
method for determining damages set out in PPG Industries, 
is inappropriate for this case. First of all, PPG 
Industries involves a contract between a general contractor 
and a subcontractor wherein the type of insurance to be 
purchased is specified with some particularity. In fact, the 
contract even specifies which insurance shall be primary. No 
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such specific language is apparent in the purchase agreement 
between Marveon and YESCO. Further, it appears that the 
opinion of the Court with respect to damages is flawed. YESCO 
urges the Court to review the case of Klonis v. Armstrong, 
436 So.2d 213 (Fla. App. 1983). It is YESCO's position 
that the reasoning of the court in Klonis makes much more 
sense with respect to determining what damages should be 
allowed as a result of the failure to purchase insurance 
pursuant to a promise. 
In Klonis, an insurance agent failed to purchase 
"described articles" insurance for theft. Naturally, a theft 
did occur and insurance that was already in place, and which 
specified that it would be excess insurance if other insurance 
existed, paid the claim. Subsequently, the insurance carrier 
that paid the claim on behalf of the insured attempted to 
subrogate against the insurance agent. In pertinent part, the 
Court stated in response to the insurance company's argument 
that it was entitled to subrogation: 
However, this argument fails for the same 
reason as the previous one — [the insured] 
had no right of action against [the 
insurance agent] for the . . . insurance 
proceeds to which the insurance company 
could become equitably subrogated. . . . 
[A]s to [the insurance company] [the 
agent's] alleged undertaking was entirely 
gratuitous, and a legal duty would run to 
[the insurance company] only if it had 
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relied upon [the insurance agent's] 
gratuitous undertaking. 
Id. at 216 and 217. 
In this case, there is no question that the insurance 
company that insured Marveon in 1978, did not rely upon any 
promises of YESCO to Marveon to purchase insurance. This would 
be ludicrous to assert. It was not even contemplated in 1978 
that Marveon would sell to YESCO and there is nothing in the 
record to indicate that Marveon's insurance company, at the 
time of the sale of Marveon to YESCO, relied in any fashion 
upon promises made by YESCO to Marveon. This is particularly 
so in light of the fact that premiums were presumably paid in 
1978, some three years prior to the sale of Marveon to YESCO. 
As stated previously, not one dime was paid by 
Marveon, or its carrier for that matter, for the negligence of 
YESCO. Marveon paid, through its insurance carrier, for only 
its portion of the fault. It did not pay for any fault of 
YESCO. Marveon certainly cannot argue that it is entitled to 
any damages from YESCO based in tort. The only possible claim 
that Marveon has against YESCO is in contract, i.e., the breach 
of the promise of YESCO to purchase insurance on behalf of 
Marveon. Notwithstanding the failure of YESCO to purchase this 
insurance, Marveon has suffered no damage. 
-10-
POINT III 
MARVEON'S INSURANCE CARRIER HAS NO SUBROGATED 
INTEREST AGAINST YESCO 
As stated previously, the doctrine of subrogation 
will allow an insurer, once it has paid a loss which 
resulted from a peril insured against, to step into the shoes 
of its insured and recoup its losses from a tort-feasor whose 
negligence caused the loss. Board of Education of Jordan 
School Dist. v. Hales, supra, at 1247. The critical 
issue here is to determine whether or not YESCO is a 
tort-feasor whose negligence caused Marveon's loss. Had 
Marveon, or its insurer, paid any money out on behalf of YESCO 
for YESCO's fault, it is clear that Marveon would have an 
indemnity claim against YESCO. As a consequence, Marveon's 
insurer could step into YESCO1s shoes and subrogate against 
YESCO for the amount it paid that was the result of YESCO's 
negligence. However, losses suffered by Marveon in the 
underlying lawsuit of this case were the result of Marveon's 
negligence, not YESCO1s. Marveon did not have a judgment 
assessed against it because YESCO failed to purchase insurance 
with Marveon as a named insured. Marveon had a judgment 
entered against it because of its negligence in installing the 
sign. The only claim that Marveon has against YESCO is one for 
breach of contract. In considering Marveon and YESCO together, 
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it is apparent that as between the two of them, Marveon has 
suffered no loss because of YESCO1s failure to purchase 
insurance. Likewise, at the time that YESCO purchased Marveon, 
there was no privity of contract between Marveon1s insurance 
carrier and YESCO. Further, there is no evidence in the record 
whatsoever that Marveon1s insurance company expected a benefit 
from the sale of Marveon to YESCO or detrimentally relied upon 
the sale of Marveon to YESCO. As a consequence, the amount of 
money that Marveon•s insurance company would not have paid if 
YESCO would have purchased insurance cannot be a measure of 
damages. It is wholly irrelevant to the consideration of the 
damages suffered by Marveon. Further, it will result in a 
complete windfall for Marveonfs insurer if YESCO should be 
obligated to pay to Marveon's insurance company the amount of 
money that Marveon's insurance company paid out on behalf of 
Marveon for Marveon1s negligence, not YESCO1s. 
Besides, as set out above, Marveon's insurer has no 
subrogated interest. The right to subrogation for Marveonfs 
insurer could only arise because it paid losses for a 
tort-feasor whose negligence caused the loss. In this case, 
the tort-feasor whose negligence caused the loss was Marveon. 
YESCOfs negligence did not cause Marveonfs loss. YESCOfs 
failure to purchase insurance on behalf of Marveon did not 
cause Marveon1s loss. Marveon caused Marveon's loss. 
-12-
Nonetheless, as between Marveon and YESCO, Marveon suffered no 
loss. 
There is no rational basis why Marveon's insurer 
should be paid any money. Marveon's insurance carrier was not 
a party to the contract between Marveon and YESCO, it was not a 
third-party beneficiary of the contract between Marveon and 
YESCO, nor did it detrimentally rely on the contract between 
Marveon and YESCO. There is no basis in tort law, contract 
law, or equity by which Marveon or Marveonfs insurance carrier 
should be able to recover any money from YESCO. 
The case of New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Ballard 
Wade, Inc., 404 P.2d 674 (Utah 1965) is compelling in this 
regard. In that case, a fire insurer, together with its 
insured lessor, repaired damage to an insured building caused 
by fire of undetermined origin. The lease agreement between 
the lessor and the lessee provided that the lessee would secure 
the lessor for loss by fire and would also return the premises 
at the end of the term in as good as condition as when they 
were received. Following repair by the insurer and the lessor, 
the insurer attempted to subrogate against the lessee for the 
costs of the repairs. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial 
court that pursuant to the lease terms, the lessee was 
absolutely liable to the lessor for any loss. However, the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah determined that the insurer 
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could not recover from the lessee because, (1) the lessee 
promised only to pay a loss to the lessor, who in that case 
lost nothing after insuring himself; (2) there was nothing in 
the lease that hinted that the insurance company was a 
third-party beneficiary; (3) the insurance company could hardly 
claim indemnity from another party who had made a written 
guarantee against loss, to which agreement the insurance 
company was neither a party nor expressly or impliedly a 
beneficiary; and (4) the lessee was not shown to be negligent. 
Id. at 675. This case clearly represents the position of the 
Utah Supreme Court that windfall recoveries by insurance 
companies against other indemnitors will not be favored. 
Again, YESCO anticipates that counsel for Marveon 
will argue that statements with respect to insurance are 
outside of the record. This is a nearsighted view. There is 
no other purpose why Marveon would wish to recover money from 
YESCO other than for it to go directly to its insurance 
carrier. Marveon can only recover for damages actually 
incurred. There is no question that it did not incur any 
damages as a result of YESCO's failure to purchase 
insurance. As a consequence, the insurance question must be 
considered by this Court if its decision is to make any sense 
in light of all of the circumstances. 
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CONCLUSION 
YESCO urges this Court to rehear the arguments of 
both counsel for Marveon and counsel for YESCO on the issue 
of damages. Although YESCO does not concede that it breached 
its contract with Marveon by failing to purchase insurance on 
behalf of Marveon, YESCO argues vigorously that the measure of 
damages, as set out by the Court and by counsel for Marveon, 
are inappropriate under the circumstances. YESCO purchased 
Marveon1s assets and contracts and, for all intents and 
purposes, was the beneficiary of Marveon1s insurance policy. 
As a consequence, Marveon's insurance carrier cannot subrogate 
against YESCO because it is essentially its insured. Further, 
no real damage was suffered by Marveon. Certainly there were 
no tort damages that Marveon suffered as a result of YESCO's 
actions. There may have been a breach of contract by YESCO for 
its failure to purchase insurance on behalf of Marveon, but 
that breach produced no actual damages to Marveon. If 
Mr. Henderson's point is taken that insurance ought to be 
removed from all consideration by this Court, then YESCO1s 
position is even stronger. No damages, in that event, can 
possibly be seen to have been suffered by Marveon as a result 
of the accident, and Marveon should not be entitled to recover 
any money for YESCO!s failure to purchase insurance, 
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particularly since no money was expended by Marveon as a result 
of that failure. 
Marveon1s insurance carrier simply has no subrogated 
interest against YESCO. Marveonfs insurance carrier's 
subrogated interest against YESCO, if any, would necessarily 
need to be founded in tort. No dollars have ever been paid out 
by Marveon1s carrier as a result of YESCO's tortious conduct 
against others. Therefore, Marveon's carrier has no subrogated 
interest. YESCO!s breach of contract, if any, is not the 
sort of interest to which Marveonfs carrier has a right of 
subrogation. 
YESCO urges this Court to rehear the matter and to 
determine that Marveon has suffered no damages as a result of 
YESCO's failure to purchase insurance pursuant to the 
Purchase Agreement, or in the alternative, to remand the matter 
to the district court for a determination of damages consistent 
with YESCO1s position. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /(s day of March, 1989. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
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